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How can we achieve a better understanding of 
the variations in international migration to, from, 
and within the Global South? To facilitate a dia-
logue about this topic, we asked a number of 
contributors to write or to provide a video 
statement about their region of expertise. To 
some we explicitly posed the following question: 
Is it possible to distinguish current or historical 
experiences or patterns of migration in the 
Global South that differ from patterns in the 
Global North?  
To affirm this central question implies a com-
monly shared migration experience in the Glob-
al South, at least in contrast to ostensibly differ-
ent patterns in the North. Arguments in favor 
could rely on the assumption that international 
migration within/from the Global South was and 
continues to be the result of unequal distribution 
of economic resources and of the broader post-
colonial power relations on a global scale. This 
draws on, among other things, histories of colo-
nialism and exploitation, experiences of slavery 
and bonded labor, and also partly on ideological 
solidarities or political collaborations between 
countries within the Global South. The counter-
position brings forward the argument that spe-
cifically Southern migration patterns are implau-
sible, in light of either a great empiric diversity 
within the juxtaposed categories North and 
South, or because of the world’s profound glob-
al connectedness, both historically and current, 
which renders such categories (next to) mean-
ingless.  
The statements assembled in this issue of 
Voices from Around the World strive to estab-
lish a better understanding of the different per-
spectives on international migration across the 
globe. To do so, we privilege perspectives on 
the Global South, as an attempt to counter the 
hegemony of research on the classic countries 
of international immigration – the USA, Canada, 
Australia, and Western Europe.  
 
Even those who support the claim that patterns 
of migration in the Global South differ from 
those in the Global North are ambivalent about 
the implications of this statement. As an anthro-
pologist devoted to in-depth case studies, An-
drew Gardner is critical of making comparisons 
beyond one’s own region of expertise, and also 
reluctant to speak of patterns typical for the 
Global South. The Arab Gulf States themselves, 
he points out, are not at all ‘typical’, but unique 
(just imagine: 90 percent of Qatar’s inhabitants 
are foreign workers). He prefers to think instead 
of a broad diversity of contemporary migration 
systems. But still he sees much of that systemic 
diversity as being located in the Global South, 
while, in his view, Northern migration policies 
are more ‘patterned’ due to their longer history 
of mutual references and standardization.  
This view is seconded by Michaela Pelican. 
When asked about specific features of migra-
tion in the Global South, she points to the in-
formality of the practices of African emigrants. 
Many African traders move into and out of their 
international destinations in the Persian Gulf 
and in China without gaining the formal status 
of settled immigrants. More affordable ways to 
cross borders, greater informality, and in-
creased flexibility seem to her to be particular 
characteristics of South-South migration.  
Guita Hourani and Eugene Sensenig-Dabbous 
take for granted that profound differences be-
tween “Northern” and “Southern” parameters of 
immigration/asylum policy exist. They argue, 
however, against judging policies in the South 
from the perspective of the North. The Interna-
tional Labour Organization, the International 
Organization of Migration, and the Swiss De-
velopment Cooperation actively intervene, with 
their Northern concepts, in the Middle Eastern 
refugee crisis, but the institutions’ suggestions 
are ill-equipped for the challenges at hand. In-
stead, as Hourany & Sensenig-Dabbous argue, 
it is precisely the “Global South approach to 
migration and asylum” that has enabled some 
countries in the MENA region to absorb dispro-
portionately large numbers of refugees.  
In his contribution, Adam K. Webb engages with 
an exemplary, distinctly non-Western pattern of 
immigration policy. He focusses on the often 
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explicitly racist exclusion from immigration that 
abounds in the legislation of many Asian states. 
While there are many studies of immigrant se-
lection and exclusion by Western countries – 
most prominently of 19th and 20th century US 
immigration acts and the “White Australia” poli-
cy – few works are looking for patterns of such 
institutionalized forms of non-Western racism. 
Examining states in the Persian Gulf, and in 
East- and Southeast Asia, Webb argues that 
scholars can no longer neglect the fact that their 
immigration policies treat foreign immigrants as 
transient guests who should be grateful to be 
allowed in, if at all, and calls for a global debate 
about how to soften boundaries instead of 
hardening them.  
Loren Landau reminds us not to see case stud-
ies on the South simply as “deviations” from an 
ostensible norm that has been modelled around 
“Northern” or “Western” cases. He points to the 
fact that scholars from the South are un-
derrepresented when it comes to theory-
building, and calls for “a conversation between 
Southern specificity and global theorizing”.  
Indeed, Min Zhou gives an example of “gaps” in 
the current (Western-biased) theories about 
migration. She first points out that Asia is a 
large continent with very diverse experiences of 
migration, yet most countries in South and 
Southeast Asia are both receiving and sending 
societies, so the patterns with regards to the 
consequences of emigration and the way in 
which immigrants are incorporated are not the 
same as they are in the North. She mentions 
Singapore as an example: Contrary to the typi-
cal Western pattern where immigrants are re-
quired to assimilate to a “core group”, this so-
ciety self-defines as “multiracial” and stresses 
that there is no such dominant culture.  
Some of the contributors argue that regional 
patterns are indeed distinguishable, but still 
stress their embeddedness within larger (or 
even global) configurations. Amarjit Kaur de-
scribes historical and contemporary migration 
flows in Southeast Asia and argues that this 
regional pattern even appears across historical 
periods. During the 19th century, Southeast 
Asia became integrated into a globalized sys-
tem of production and trade, which also facili-
tated massive migration flows of mainly un-
skilled laborers from southern China and South 
India to Southeast Asia. From the 1970s on-
wards, less-skilled foreign workers (as well as 
highly educated migrants) again became of 
crucial importance to some Southeast Asian 
economies (Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand).  
Adapa Satyanarayana adds an Indian perspec-
tive to this. He looks at the linkages between 
South India and particularly Burma, Malaysia, 
and the Gulf States during the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries. He argues that in this peri-
od, Asian migration was comparable in scale to 
trans-Atlantic migration. In other words, the 
South Asian regional system has to be consid-
ered part of a globalizing migration pattern.  
In an interview, Vincent Houben also reflects on 
the question of whether there is a shared migra-
tion experience in the Global South. From his 
perspective as a historian of Southeast Asia he 
presents strong arguments for approaching 
North and South as historically connected 
(mainly through the colonial organization of un-
free labor migration), which makes it difficult to 
theorize two distinguishable patterns. On top of 
that, he notices an increasing blurring of this 
dividing line between North and South today.  
Ibrahim Awad, who works on the Middle East, 
makes a similar point. From his perspective, 
each and every regional migration movement 
has to be understood as an element of a larger, 
and ultimately global, system. He points to the 
example of the emergence of nation states: the 
drawing of new state borders continues to 
cause much human displacement, and is often 
directly influenced by the interest of big interna-
tional players.  
Noting that European politicians (or more gen-
erally, those in the rich West) on the one hand 
praise mobility, while on the other hand seeing 
immigrants from Africa as a “predatory incon-
venience”, Francis Nyamnjoh also argues that 
taking into account the history of (neo-) colonial-
ism is crucial in order to understand todays pat-
tern of migration in a deeply unequal world.  
Finally, some answer our central question em-
phatically in the negative. Alejandro Grimson 
decidedly rejects a comparison between pat-
terns of the South and the North, because to 
him these are overgeneralizing categories that 
obscure differences between migration pro-
cesses all over the world. First, he says, there 
are some similarities across large regions that 
span the North-South divide. Second, there are 
differences within “the South” in some regions, 
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particularly when migration is concerned. In 
Latin America, for example, there would be var-
ious migration patterns rather than just one. 
Jorge Durand also outlines the existence of 
regional migration systems within the Americas, 
and stresses the diversity between migration 
patterns of nearby countries: some receive im-
migration, some experience complex configura-
tions of emigration, others are primarily transit 
countries. But in his view, in the Americas the 
northern and southern parts must be seen as 
elements of an integrated system.  
He therefore considers a conceptual distinction 
between North and South to be of little use.  
Tobias Schwarz is puzzled by how statistics on 
international migration are often visualized, for 
instance when the total amount of “South-North” 
migration is presented in a diagram, or when 
continents are taken as the basic components 
of a bar chart. In his contribution he reflects 
upon the effects caused by the use of different 
ways of visualizing the statistics of migration, 
and rejects North/South as suitable units of 
comparison.
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CHANGE IS INEVITABLE 
Interview with Andrew Gardner (Associate Professor 
of Anthropology, University of Puget Sound) about 
labor migration to the Arab Gulf states. The interview 
was conducted by Tobias Schwarz. 
Tobias Schwarz: Prof. Gardner, you are an an-
thropologist working on transnational labor mi-
grants from Asia, Africa, and other parts of the 
Middle East to the Gulf States. Could you briefly 
outline the main characteristics of (labor) migra-
tion to the Arabian Peninsula?  
 
Andrew Gardner: I can try. First of all, there is a 
publication 
(http://www.escwa.un.org/information/publicatio
ns/edit/upload/sdd-07-2.pdf) I bumped into 
some years ago that suggests the Gulf States 
(that is, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, 
the United Arab Emirates, and Oman) comprise 
the third-largest transnational destination for 
labor migration in the contemporary world — 
after Europe and North America. While I’m not 
so interested in counting transnational migrants, 
I think this assertion really captures a funda-
mental fact about labor migration to the Arab 
Gulf states: For tens of millions of migrants and 
tens of millions of households, most of which 
are scattered across South Asia and Southeast 
Asia, the hydrocarbon-rich states of the Arabian 
Peninsula figure prominently in the limited eco-
nomic options they face. And considering how 
cyclical these migrations often are, the number 
of impacted households is actually much larger 
– every year millions of migrants return home 
and millions more of new migrants stream to the 
region.  
 
TS: Can you describe the typical experience of 
a labor migrant to the Gulf?  
AG: Over years of ethnographic research, I’ve 
really had to embrace the diversity of pathways 
that migrants follow to the Arabian Peninsula. 
But typically, potential migrants pay US $1000, 
US $2000, and sometimes even more to a labor 
broker in the sending state. That money “pur-
chases” an entry ticket into this transnational 
migration system, in the form of a two-year la-
bor contract that secures the migrant’s em-
ployment. The money paid for this contract of-
ten delves into household savings, and it often 
involves mortgaging the productive assets of 
the migrant’s household (imagine, for example, 
mortgages on agricultural land). The labor bro-
ker himself keeps some portion of that money. 
The remainder makes its way to the employer 
or his proxies in the Gulf States. As research-
ers, we have very little insight into this particular 
junction of the migration process. But important-
ly, those debts remain in place in the sending 
state.  
 
When the transnational migrant arrives in the 
Gulf States, he or she might encounter all sorts 
of different situations, and no summary can 
really capture the diversity of those experienc-
es. Indeed, my own ethnographic work has at-
tempted to portray that variability, or at least 
fragments of it. At best, the migrant prospers in 
his or her work, repays the loan paid to a labor 
broker back home, remits monies with regulari-
ty, and secures a second employment contract 
for a lower cost. But all sorts of things can go 
wrong. In a recent large-scale survey, we de-
termined that the non-payment of promised 
wages, improper documentation, and passport 
confiscation were common features of these 
transnational migrants’ experiences in Qatar. 
And while those problems are commonplace, 
more significant problems – and combinations 
of those problems – are also common.  
 
TS: I assume that many of the hardships the 
migrants face are somehow related to the 
sponsorship system? 
AG: Yes. Researchers and scholars (myself 
included) theorize that the extraordinary varia-
bility in migrants’ experiences in the Gulf States 
results from the kafala – the sponsorship sys-
tem that governs migration to the Arab Gulf 
states. In essence, the kafala distributes por-
tions of the right and responsibility of governing 
foreign migrants to those migrants' employers. 
Employers are typically citizens, or those citi-
zen-sponsors’ proxies. As a result of this ar-
rangement, the transnational labor migrant is 
locked to a particular job, and her or his fate 
depends heavily on the on the actions (or inac-
tions) of that employer. From another angle, the 
states themselves have divested significant 
portions of the responsibility for governing their 
vast foreign workforces. The divestiture of this 
responsibility to citizen-sponsors explains why 
some migrants’ experiences in the Gulf answer 
 Reflections on migration in the Global South – Voices from around the world  
Global South Studies Center, University of Cologne, Germany – http://gssc.uni-koeln.de/node/781 
their financial dreams, while, for others, migra-
tion results in horribly difficult years abroad and 
a financial cataclysm for their households back 
home.  
 
TS: Is the kafala system really a suitable foun-
dation for the immigration policy of a country so 
badly in need of many cheap laborers?  
AG: This system is not static. After decades of 
existence, the unfree labor market structured by 
the kafala has been normalized throughout the 
region. Potential migrants expect to pay for their 
labor contracts, and employers expect to gov-
ern and control their workforce in ways that are 
somewhat unusual elsewhere in the contempo-
rary world. It’s also important not to lose sight of 
the extraordinary proportions of migrants in the 
Gulf States. In Qatar, for example, more than 
nine out of ten residents is a foreign worker. But 
assimilation is not really central in the broader 
migrant agenda in the Gulf States, and naturali-
zation is not possible for migrants there (see 
van Waas’ recent paper for an overview). The 
inflexibility of this unfree labor market is also a 
significant challenge for the development of the 
Gulf economies.  
Responses, however, have emerged. Many 
transnational labor migrants are employed by 
“manpower agencies”, an arrangement that 
preserves the control and governance of the 
foreign workforce, but allows that workforce to 
be rented to particular companies or concerns. 
There is also a substantial population of labor 
migrants operating under “free visas”, an ar-
rangement in which foreign migrants regularly 
pay a sponsor who allows them to pursue vari-
able employment as they see fit. These are two 
avenues by which the inflexibility of the kafala is 
circumvented by labor and employers.  
Perhaps that yields enough of a sketch of this 
migration system to compare it with other mi-
grations systems in the contemporary world and 
in history. After years of ethnographic fieldwork, 
I really came to understand these migrations to 
Arabia as fragments of a migration system, with 
many interrelated pieces and parts distributed 
across the continents adjoining the Middle East. 
And after exploring this migration system for 
more than a decade, I’ve begun to describe it 
as a migration industry. William Walters’ work 
led me to that idea. Terming it a migration in-
dustry draws attention to its systemic proper-
ties, to the presence of profit-seeking motives 
throughout that system, and to the (human) 
resources that system depends upon.  
A few random notes in addition: It’s best not to 
lose sight of the extraordinary proportions of 
migrants in these destinations. In Qatar, for 
example, more than nine out of ten residents 
are foreign workers. And it should be mentioned 
that naturalization and citizenship are not pos-
sible for migrants in the Gulf States, and that 
assimilation is not really central in the broader 
migrant agenda there. That yields a very inter-
esting and unusual sociocultural brew. But 
that’s another complicated and multifaceted 
topic!  
 
TS: Would it be an exaggeration to call this cur-
rent labor migration regime a unique system, 
compared to other regions of the world? 
AG: As a researcher and scholar, I have been 
so immersed in exploring this particular migra-
tion system that I’ve devoted insufficient time to 
building a good foundation for the sort of com-
parison your question requests. I can make a 
couple of observations, however, that might 
illuminate such comparisons. As I mention in 
the last chapter of my book City of Strangers, it 
was more than fifteen years ago that I first en-
countered a group of Indian transnational labor 
migrants abandoned by their employer. They 
dwelled in crowded rooms with beds pressed 
against all walls, they faced the non-payment of 
the salaries promised to them, and their families 
back at home suffered under the substantial 
debts they had incurred to send the migrant 
abroad in the first place. This is a scenario I 
would come to know well in the Gulf, but this 
first encounter occurred years before I set foot 
on the Arabian Peninsula. That first encounter 
was in a dog-eared motel on a highway in 
Southern Louisiana – in the heart of America’s 
oilpatch. The simple message here, I think, is 
that these sorts of arrangements and exploita-
tions are recurring features of contemporary 
migration and mobility, and are neither con-
signed to the Arabian Gulf States nor to the 
Global South.  
I think these systemic and exploitative relations 
are also not consigned to the contemporary era. 
In our session concerning labor contracts at the 
recent GSSC conference, the parallels between 
the contemporary migration system I described 
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and various colonial era forms of forced labor, 
slavery, and coolie conscription were striking – 
readily discernible in Oliver Tappe’s work on the 
history of coolie labor in New Caledonia, in Al-
exander Keese’s work on the history of forced 
labor in Southern Africa, and Vincent Huber’s 
work on historical labor relations in Java. To 
me, these parallels and continuities reveal the 
enduring and foundational nature of the forces 
at work. I think the geography of those forces 
and powers is less territorialized than in previ-
ous eras. Alternatively, I think many of us can 
see the global South in our own backyards, or 
infused into the commodities, products, and 
peoples that move about our world.  
I do recognize that while these migrations and 
the forces that govern them reveal some uni-
versal and deterritorialized characteristics, they 
inevitably draw upon local customs, cultures, 
and histories. The universal qualities, tenden-
cies and compulsions that pervade our world 
system are actualized in real places – in real 
and diverse social and cultural settings, each of 
which is partially organized and governed within 
the container of the nation-state. The patterns I 
see in the Gulf migration system point to these 
global and seemingly universal forces, but 
those forces are recognizably articulated and 
materialized in the very real circumstances of 
contemporary Arabia. But the infusion or evolu-
tion of any particular migration system, in dia-
lectic with local norms, histories, and customs, 
is also counterbalanced by the agency woven 
into many contemporary mobilities: Malaysia, 
India, or Kuwait, consider a potential Nepalese 
migrant. Hong Kong or Kuwait, weigh a young 
potential migrant in the Philippines.  
In conclusion, I think the empirical pursuit of an 
understanding of the diversity of contemporary 
migration systems is an invaluable academic 
task, and much of that systemic diversity can be 
found in the Global South.  
Interestingly, however, my example from Loui-
siana was in the Global North. And the Arab 
Gulf States themselves certainly challenge the 
boundaries and thresholds of any geographical 
conception of the Global South. Patterns cer-
tainly adhere more to migrations in the Global 
North, a result, I think, of standardization, mod-











Forthcoming/Imagined Modernity: An image on 
a fence in Doha, Qatar (2012). These comput-
er-generated images of the future proliferate in 
Doha, and provide a window to the imagined 
social terrain of the forthcoming future. 
 
TS: You’ve mentioned the enormous number of 
foreigners in the Gulf States, and pointed to the 
exclusive immigration policy there that differs 
widely from policies of immigrant incorporation 
in “Western” countries of immigration. I wonder 
if excluding immigrant workers almost entirely 
from access to the social and political life would 
not over time undermine social cohesion?  
AG: I think it definitely does undermine social 
cohesion, and that observation is indeed central 
to the thesis I’ve crafted for the new manuscript 
I’m currently drafting. The more I think about the 
idea of social cohesion, however, the more 
wary I become. Perhaps it is the longstanding 
anthropological concern with ethnocentricity, 
but I’m wary of the valorization of social cohe-
sion that permeates many contemporary schol-
arly conversations. The value of social cohesion 
amidst contemporary diversities is one that has 
been developed and articulated in western so-
cial science, the western public sphere, and in a 
western (and democratic) political context. What 
portion of our understanding of social cohesion 
– and our high estimation of its value – is a 
product of the predominant forms of migration 
that we’ve historically witnessed in Europe and 
North America? 
With some exceptions (such as the Native 
American population that occupied my continent 
centuries ago), the migrations we’ve collectively 
digested almost ubiquitously consist of frag-
mentary immigrant minorities assimilated into a 
much larger majority society. So what portion of 
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the value we attribute to social cohesion is tied 
to that historical experience, the democratic 
foundations in which it evolved, and the particu-
lar arrangements of state, citizen, and nation 
that predominate in Western Europe and North 
America? This is not meant as a justification for 
the system that has emerged in the Arab Gulf 
States, but rather meant to exemplify the care 
we need to take in assessing diverse migra-
tions. 
 
TS: I agree that I was not sufficiently aware of 
the normative grounding of my last question. 
Let me ask more specifically about the immigra-
tion policies: Do you think they might become 
dysfunctional and hence less restrictive in the 
future? Or is this system stable enough to be 
maintained for generations to come? 
AG: I think that this system is inevitably unsta-
ble. It is driven by the hydrocarbon wealth these 
nations possess (and contingent on that wealth, 
I think). Even amidst that wealth, however, oth-
er changes are afoot. Most of the GCC states 
are incrementally bringing themselves into 
alignment with the systemic norms and frame-
works that shape migrations in Europe and 
North America. Attitudes about migrants, and 
about human rights more broadly, are also rap-
idly evolving on the Arabian Peninsula, with a 
noticeable generational shift in those attitudes. 
Employers, and the economies more broadly, 
would benefit from more labor mobility, although 
this attitude has yet to coalesce as a move-
ment. The Gulf States continue to struggle with 
building the vast institutional framework to gov-
ern and regulate the status quo of migration in 
the region. Governing the detritus of the kafala 
is, perhaps, an impossible task. So while I think 
that change is inevitable, I also think social co-
hesion is a problematic goal, particularly when 
promoted by scholars and others in the long-
developed world.  
Interestingly, however, while naturalization and 
assimilation are never aspirations for the Gulf 
States and their citizenries, there is a form of 
social cohesion that is visibly promoted. That 
social cohesion is foremost a class-based con-
ceptualization of social cohesion, albeit inflected 
with ethnicity and nationality. Visitors and for-
eign residents to the Gulf States are familiar 
with the proliferation of billboards, dioramas, 
scale models, and architectural drawings that 
portray the future that will soon arrive. In these 
images of the future, local Arabs predominate, 
but they mix with a refined minority population 
of computer-generated foreigners. This fits with 
the overarching long-term plans by which these 
nations frame the present: labor migrants are a 
temporary demographic feature of the present. 
After their cities are constructed, this labor force 
will return home, and the post-oil cities will func-
tion as cosmopolitan hubs in a knowledge-
based global economy.  
 
Forthcoming/Imagined Modernity: This comput-
er-generated image portrays Msheireb, an ur-
ban redevelopment of a historic district in the 
center of Doha. 
 
For more than a decade, Andrew Gardner has 
worked on transnational migrants and the Gulf Arab 
societies that host them. His most recent publica-
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SPACE FOR INFORMAL ACTIVITIES  
Interview with Michaela Pelican (Junior Professor of 
Cultural and Social Anthropology, University of Co-
logne, Germany) on African Migrants to China and 
the Middle East. The interview was conducted by 
Tobias Schwarz. 
Tobias Schwarz: Michaela, what is the main 
focus of your research?  
Michaela Pelican: I’m working on migration from 
Cameroon to the Gulf States – in particular to 
Dubai – and to China – in particular to Guang-
zhou. Both cities, Dubai and Guangzhou, are 
centres for trade, and this attracts migrants from 
many parts of Africa. My focus is on Came-
roonians who live in these two cities.  
 
TS: South-South migration is not a new phe-
nomenon, yet the migrants from Cameroon you 
are following to China and to the Gulf are in a 
particular new situation: China has not received 
many international immigrants in its past; also, 
Dubai has become a destination for migrants 
from Africa relatively recently. Can you briefly 
outline the basic characteristics of these two 
migration routes? 
MP: That’s true. Both migration routes started 
only in the late 1980s and early 1990s, to be-
come more relevant as a result of the closing 
borders to Europe and the economic growth in 
the Gulf as well as in China. At the same time, 
many job opportunities disappeared in Came-
roon due to economic recession and the effects 
of structural adjustment programs. Hence many 
people were looking to find other opportunities, 
often within Cameroon in the informal sector. 
But there was also a vision for going abroad, 
basically within Africa to other neighboring Afri-
can countries, such as to Gabon or South Afri-
ca, or to other centers where they could find 
more economic opportunities.  
As I pointed out in an earlier paper (Pelican and 
Tatah 2009), Dubai and China emerged as an 
extension of these economic opportunities 
abroad. So, most people who are going to ei-
ther of these destinations are first and foremost 
looking for trade opportunities. The destinations 
in Asia are new for immigration from Africa, be-
cause beforehand only a few African traders 
would mostly go to Shanghai or Hong Kong, 
Thailand, and Singapore. It was not that such 
routes did not exist before, but they were run by 
few, individual traders. The same applies to 
Dubai.  
Only recently, the latter became a very attrac-
tive destination. In the 1990s, more people 
started to bring goods, such as mobile phones 
from Dubai, and it became known as a center 
for trade. Therefore, more and more people 
became interested in this trade route. On top of 
that, the immigration regulations there are much 
more liberal than they are in Europe. Basically 
you can go there on a tourist or short-term 
business visa and try your luck, either to buy 
goods and transport them home, or to find a 
job. This is what many young Cameroonians 
then started to do.  
China emerged alongside as a similar destina-
tion for the same kinds of reasons. The huge 
difference is that in Dubai people can speak 
English, and this makes it easier in terms of 
finding your way around. China became attrac-
tive for those who have a lot of capital to invest 
and who would go directly to factories to com-
mand the production, and then export the goods 
back to Cameroon and neighboring African 
countries. So you find different types of migrant 
traders: those with limited capital and an inter-
est in buying smaller quantities tend to go to 
Dubai, while those with more money and pre-
arranged business contacts venture into China. 
This is the perspective from Cameroon.  
 
TS: Can you describe more in detail the com-
position of the Cameroonian emigrant popula-
tion in Dubai? 
MP: I started doing fieldwork in Dubai in 2008 
and I have been there three times – in 2008, 
2011, and 2014 – and witnessed some devel-
opments. As compared to migrants from South 
and Southeast Asia, the number of Africans is 
relatively small; about two thousand Came-
roonians live in Dubai on a more permanent 
basis. People travel in and out more frequently, 
but those who are there on a permanent basis 
are relatively few, because in Dubai you can get 
a work contract for no more than two years, 
then you have to renew it. As I have described 
in more detail in a recent article (Pelican 2014), 
many are working as intermediaries for traders, 
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helping them to buy their goods, finding hotels, 
making deals, acquiring their visas, sending 
money in and out. Also, over time, more and 
more people have got into the formal economy 
and some of them have employment in hospi-
tals, malls, banks and so on. So you can see 
that something like an established labor migra-
tion route between the Gulf and Cameroon has 
been emerging. I also noticed more and more 
travel agencies that offer visa to Dubai at a rela-
tively moderate price, even by Cameroonian 
standards, and even more so compared to the 
cost of a visa to Europe.  
 
TS: And how large is the community in Guang-
zhou? 
MP: I have visited Guangzhou in 2013, 2014, 
and 2015. The Cameroonian community in Chi-
na is probably about the same size as in Dubai, 
but you can find three main categories: busi-
nesspeople, students (those with scholarships 
offered by the Chinese government, but also 
self-sponsored students), and English language 
teachers. The latter are professionals who were 
often also teachers back in Cameroon. They 
were recruited either by the Chinese govern-
ment or the Confucius Institute, or arrived on 
their own initiative; that is, they just went to Chi-
na and found schools to work in there. Hence 
this is a more diversified group, and their indi-
vidual experiences are also somewhat different. 
I mentioned before the language difference: if 
you want to get along in China, especially in 
more rural areas and not only in the biggest 
cities, speaking Chinese is a must. This puts 
considerable stress on the Cameroonian mi-
grants.  
On top of that, the number of foreigners in Chi-
na is very small, below 2 percent of the whole 
population, so you can imagine the kind of at-
tention the African migrants attract. Also in the 
Gulf States, Africans are a minority. But in Du-
bai for example, the proportion of the population 
comprised by foreigners is 85 percent, so even 
while only a very small proportion are African, it 
still generates a different feeling of multicultural-
ism, internationality and so on, if you have peo-
ple from India, Pakistan, the Philippines and 
many other parts of Asia, from Europe, etc. In 
contrast, the situation in China is totally differ-
ent. Black Africans are very visible foreigners, 
and they attract a lot of attention in public. In 
Guangzhou, the population has become some-
what used to having Africans there for quite 
some time now, because Guangzhou is a trade 
hub and because of the Canton fair which at-
tracts foreigners from all over the world. There 
is also an Arab community, so they are in some 
ways more open to having foreigners than in 
the more rural parts of China. But still, the Afri-
cans attract a lot of attention – sometimes posi-
tive curiosity, but often they experience it nega-
tively. So it is indeed quite challenging for them 
to be there. Some of these challenges have 
also been reflected in the photo-exhibition that I 
have organized together with the Chinese pho-
tographer Li Dong at the University of Cologne 
in autumn last year. Interestingly, however, I 
found that there are two major and quite differ-
ent impressions Cameroonian migrants have 
outlined in their conversations with me: One is 
that China seems culturally and linguistically so 
different, and so difficult to adapt to, that you 
cannot feel at home there. On the other hand, 
there are also those who have learned Chinese 
and have found their way into Chinese society, 
and who much more appreciate being there and 
benefitting from the economic opportunities that 
are offered in China.  
 
TS: Having talked about a specific experience 
of South-South migration: Do you think there 
are characteristics of migration in the South that 
stand out – and which are probably even typical 
of the Global South – compared to the Global 
North?  
MP: I can only talk about migration by Africans 
to destinations in Asia – both located in the 
Global South. Yes, we can see a pattern, in that 
there is a stress on entrepreneurship. People 
are trying to find ways to establish themselves 
economically, which also includes the informal 
sector. In Europe or in the USA, the informal 
sector is much more regulated, and harder to 
enter. I have the impression that these destina-
tions – like the Gulf States and China, but also 
other destinations in South East Asia – are now 
becoming more and more interesting for Came-
roonians and others, precisely because these 
countries’ immigration regulations are not yet 
very fixed or exclusionary, at least where entry 
as a trader or a “tourist” is concerned. So you 
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can find ways to go there on relatively easy 
ways in a sense that the visa is not as expen-
sive and the restrictions are not as high as they 
are, for instance, for the EU. There is also more 
space for informal activities. From the perspec-
tive of African migrants, I think this is specific to 
the Global South, as compared to the Global 
North.  
 
Michaela Pelican is Junior Professor of Cultural and 
Social Anthropology at the University of Cologne and 
works on South-South mobility and migrant transna-
tionalism in Cameroon, Gabon, South Africa, the-
United Arab Emirates, and China. Read more on her 
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MIGRATION PATTERNS IN THE GLOBAL 
SOUTH. THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH 
AFRICA AS A REFLECTION OF POLICY 
ALTERNATIVES IN THE FIELDS OF SE-
CURITY, LABOR MARKET, AND SOCIAL 
WELFARE PLANNING 
by Guita Hourani & Eugene Sensenig-Dabbous 
(Lebanese Emigration Research Center, Notre 
Dame University, Lebanon). 
Is it possible to distinguish between patterns of 
migration in the Global South and in the Global 
North? If so, which indicators should we chose 
to compare the two? Are the presence of a 
Northern style active labor market policy, a mul-
ti-stakeholder dialogue process, and a compre-
hensive social welfare system the proper 
benchmarks for assessing the success or fail-
ure of policy makers in these two parts of the 
world?  
Migration and refugee patterns have traditional-
ly been explained by examining the impact of 
push and pull factors. More recently, a network 
approach has become prevalent, highlighting 
the roles played by diaspora communities and 
extended families, linking the Global South and 
Global North. Accordingly, migrants and asylum 
seekers are no longer seen as mere objects of 
economic, security-related, ecological, or cul-
tural developments, encouraging them to leave 
one region and migrate or escape to another. 
They are also studied as the subjects of their 
own fate, at least to the extent that the respec-
tive context allows them to be so.  
The societies of the Middle East and North Afri-
ca (MENA) are currently in a state of turmoil, 
which has accentuated the already existing def-
icits on the part of their governments with re-
spect to tackling population flows. Whereas the 
states of the Arab Gulf have attempted to tight-
en their control over the large numbers of mi-
grant workers in their region and some coun-
tries in the Maghreb are cooperating success-
fully with the European Neighbourhood Policy 
(ENP) in order to better coordinate migration to 
the EU, countries like Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, 
Libya, Sudan, and Syria have become transit 
routes for – as well as the source of – unregu-
lated migration to the North. In this context, 
Turkey plays a special role as an aspiring EU 
member state. Although it is an important coun-
try of origin for labor migration to the EU and – 
more recently – has become a popular transit 
route for illegal migration to the West, its em-
beddedness within the European accession 
mechanism, the ‘acquis communautaire’, places 
it squarely within the logic of Northern policy 
development and thus outside the context of 
this assessment of the Global South. Turkey 
does illustrate, however, that a Middle Eastern 
country can develop, given adequate support 
and the appropriate policy parameters, in the 
direction of a Northern society based on rule of 
law.  
Following Northern logic, any analysis of migra-
tion patterns would assume they are strongly 
influenced by declared governmental policy 
goals, corresponding legislation, and transpar-
ent implementation. Accordingly, this would 
lead the casual observer to conclude that many 
MENA countries have lost control of population 
flows within and across their borders. From the 
perspective of the North, any government mi-
gration regime which cannot control its borders, 
register migrants and refugees in the labor mar-
ket, adequately provide infrastructure services 
to foreigners living legally within the country, 
and repatriate those aliens it wishes to get rid 
of, must be assessed as being either weak or 
non-existent; one of the indicators of a failed 
state. From the perspective of the South, how-
ever, this is not the case.  
Two attributes of policy development and im-
plementation in the South often elude observers 
from the North. Firstly, taking the MENA region 
as a case in point, many governments have no 
intention of providing blanket social welfare ser-
vices to their indigenous populations. The state 
is primarily concerned with security issues, i.e. 
with protecting itself against its own people. 
When available, quality public health care and 
education, reliable and affordable access to 
water, electricity, and waste management, and 
comprehensive unemployment and retirement 
benefits are utilized to secure the loyalty of spe-
cific segments of the population within the con-
text of a patron-client relationship. A country 
that only selectively cares for its own people 
cannot be expected to provide benefits to the 
migrants and refugees in its midst. Secondly, 
the traditional assumption amongst policy ana-
lysts is that political systems develop policy by 
first initiating an agenda-setting process, fol-
lowed by decision-making within the legislative 
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arena, and finally implementing the laws passed 
– for better or worse – by the executive branch 
of government. In the MENA region, as in many 
parts of the Global South, this scenario does 
not hold true. The weakest link in the chain of 
policy development is the actual execution of 
governmental decisions by state authorities. In 
countries with a semblance of democracy, such 
as Lebanon or Tunisia, the will of the people 
can be freely expressed in the marketplace of 
ideas. Legislature often follows up on these 
demands and codifies them into well-crafted 
laws, based on the French or Anglo-American 
legal traditions. However, once passed, this 
legislation is rarely implemented effectively, 
leading to the suspicion that there was no inten-
tion to properly implement it in the first place. A 
culture of impunity is the norm, rule of law the 
exception.  
The net result of this situation is a de facto sys-
tem in which a laissez-faire approach to migrant 
and refugee welfare is combined with a securiti-
zation of government policy towards its respec-
tive foreign populations. The challenges to 
many of the authoritarian regimes in the MENA 
during the Arab Spring as of 2011, combined 
with the protracted conflicts in Iraq, Libya, Syria, 
and Yemen, facilitated to rise of the Islamic 
State or “Daesh”, as it is referred to in the 
MENA. The genuine security threats emanating 
from organized terrorism in the MENA have 
intensified the logic of state security considera-
tions with respect to migration. There has been 
no proportional attempt to deal with the human 
security challenges facing foreigners in the re-
gion.  
This Global South approach to migration and 
asylum has enabled the countries of the MENA 
region to absorb disproportionately large num-
bers of refugees, first from Sudan and Iraq and 
more recently from Syria. Whereas Turkey – as 
an EU accession state – and Jordan – as one of 
the few authoritarian regimes in the region 
which has gone unchallenged by the Arab 
Spring – have dealt with the influx of Syrians 
systematically through the use of mandatory 
camp settlements, the rest of the region has 
assumed a “free market” mentality. This is par-
ticularly evident in Lebanon, which has an in-
digenous population of 4 million and a refugee 
population of between 1.5 and 2 million. The 
secret of Lebanon’s success is the transfer of 
responsibility for the refugees from the central 
government to the municipal level. However, 
local governments throughout the country have 
only been able to provide rudimentary services 
to their refugee populations because of a mas-
sive influx of foreign aid supplied directly to the 
local level by NGOs, international donors, and 
individual foreign governments. By pumping 
huge amounts of revenue into the economy to 
service the refugees’ emergency needs, inter-
national aid organizations have distorted the 
socio-economic balance in the country, leading 
to a uniquely Lebanese form of “Dutch disease”.  
In conclusion, it would seem that the very ab-
sence of the Northern parameters governing 
migration and refugee policy in the Global 
South has enabled many countries in the MENA 
to cope with numbers of refugees which would 
have easily overwhelmed countries in the Glob-
al North. Currently, various international play-
ers, such as the International Labor Organiza-
tion, the International Organization of Migration, 
and the Swiss Development Cooperation, are 
attempting to counter this trend. By encouraging 
the countries in the MENA region to adopt 
Northern policy paradigms, they hope to sup-
port an active approach to labor-market devel-
opment, a comprehensive social welfare re-
gime, and a multi-stakeholder approach to gov-
ernance. One of the main goals of these well-
intentioned Global North programs is to give the 
migrants themselves a say in policy develop-
ment and implementation and thus promote 
social justice in the region. Should the initiatives 
of the ILO, IOM, and Swiss government in the 
MENA be successful, they might very well un-
dermine the laissez-faire mentality which has 
enabled the region to cope successfully with 
otherwise overwhelming migration and refugee 
challenges up until now.  
 
Guita Hourani is the Director of the Lebanese Emi-
gration Research Center (LERC), Notre Dame Uni-
versity, Lebanon. 
Eugene Sensenig-Dabbous holds a chair of the De-
partments of Political Science, Public Administration, 
and International Affairs, Notre Dame University, 
Lebanon. 
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BECOMING AN IMMIGRANT COUNTRY: 
DOUBLE STANDARDS, EAST AND WEST 
by Adam K. Webb (Resident Professor of Political 
Science at the Hopkins-Nanjing Center, Nanjing 
University, China) 
What is an “immigrant country”? Places with a 
long history of large-scale settlement —
America, Canada, Argentina, and Australia, for 
example – surely are. Others in Europe have 
also become so in recent decades, even though 
many of them, like Germany, begrudged admit-
ting as much until not long ago. 
When we look beyond the West and its off-
shoots, to Asia, the idea of not being an “immi-
grant country”, and not planning on becoming 
one, is deeply entrenched. As I noted in a re-
cent article (“Not an Immigrant Country?”), 
countries in East Asia and the Persian Gulf in-
sist that the standards of relative openness and 
multiculturalism that have gradually prevailed in 
the West – at least as an ideal – do not apply to 
them. Double standards abound. In Japan and 
China, business establishments matter-of-factly 
turn away foreigners (on Post-Mao China: 
Sautman 1994; on Japan: Diène 2006). In the 
Emirates and Kuwait, generations of guest 
workers and their families are excluded from 
citizenship (on Gulf States' illiberal policies: 
Weiner 1990). The chasm between the national 
and the foreign, and the cavalier comfort with 
which stereotypes are applied in policy and dai-
ly practice, are striking in much of Asia. One 
would have to go back to the early twentieth 
century in Europe to find anything comparable 
(on patterns of Asian racism in general: Wash-
ington 1990). 
 
Asian societies get away with things that have 
become unacceptable in the late modern West. 
There are many reasons for this double stand-
ard. Asian countries’ recovery of confidence has 
often revolved around playing up their sover-
eignty and distinctness from the West. Nation-
building has drawn bright lines between citizens 
and outsiders. Postcolonialism has also, in 
many cases, been not so much about universal 
equality as about securing the dominance of 
national élites and national majorities within 
their own space. Tribalism is taken for granted. 
Many in the West typically either overlook non-
Western racism or treat it with kid gloves. Well-
meaning observers who favor cosmopolitanism, 
liberal equality, and open borders in the West 
tread lightly when they encounter problematic 
practices elsewhere. Either they suggest that 
the process of opening must run its course, 
however slowly, and that for outsiders prema-
turely to critique those who were once on the 
receiving end of European imperialism would be 
to pick on the underdog (on selective narratives 
about who commits racism and what duties are 
owed over its legacies: Bhargava 2007) or they 
hold the non-West to a permanently different 
standard (on supposed differences between 
e.g. Japanese exclusion of immigrants and 
Western racism: Carens 1992). Perhaps coun-
tries that do not pretend to be open are in a 
different league from those that do. Or perhaps 
the West’s colonial past imposes unique bur-
dens: immigration might be the consequence of 
earlier empire-building. These fumbling distinc-
tions unravel at the margins, of course. Sweden 
and Switzerland are expected to become immi-
grant countries even though they had no em-
pires; and the majority of Asian countries that 
have ratified high-minded UN conventions 
against discrimination are forgiven for not really 
meaning it. 
Perhaps it will be said that such double stand-
ards do not greatly matter. But with the rise of 
new Asian powers to more global influence, 
hard questions must be asked. Dismissive pro-
testations that there is no racism in Asia can no 
longer be taken at face value. As economic and 
diplomatic influence shifts eastward, and more 
and more foreigners encounter Asian societies 
firsthand, practices on the ground gain atten-
tion. These societies already have immigrants 
— from Pakistani laborers in Dubai, to Nigerian 
traders in Guangzhou — who can no longer be 
treated as transient guests who should be 
grateful for short-term opportunities. The kind of 
scrutiny that the West has attracted in recent 
decades with regard to race and immigration 
inevitably must extend to Asia.  
 
This scrutiny is also imperative because of the 
implications for global order. The ideas about 
national identity that Asian societies hold will 
spill over into the kind of world that they will 
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help shape in this century. When we scratch the 
surface, there are two competing images of 
world order taking shape. 
One is a continued trend toward openness, a 
flattening of boundaries, and an emerging glob-
al citizenship. It would build on the best of ex-
periments like the European Union and UN-
ASUR. The hard boundaries of sovereignty, and 
migratory restrictions, would eventually look like 
an aberration in human history, as the world 
returns to the long-term pattern of diverse and 
fluid open space. It would look like the old cos-
mopolitan empires, but on a grander scale, flat-
ter, and with rule of law. 
The other vision would harden boundaries, and 
shore up the Westphalian state as the perma-
nent organizing principle of the global land-
scape for generations to come. The West’s shift 
to more inclusive ideas of citizenship lately 
would be a mere quirk in one area of the world. 
Human beings would be defined by their na-
tionality. Our great-grandchildren would still live 
in a world of discrimination, visas, and deporta-
tions. And the shift of influence from some cor-
ners of the world to others would mean the rise 
and fall of collectivities, with all of the stereotyp-
ing and hierarchies that tend to follow. This is, 
among the more nationalistic currents of opinion 
in Asia, the meaning of the “Asian century”. 
Dignity requires walls. Bide one’s time and ride 
out openness, because those preaching it will 
not last. 
In this contest of visions, how consciously the 
questions are asked matters a great deal. Ignor-
ing non-Western racism does the world no fa-
vors in the long run. To indulge postcolonial 
double standards for the sake of supposed gen-
tleness would mean, as power shifts, sleep-
walking into a much more hard-edged world 
quite at odds with what liberal idealists really 
prefer. Tougher and more consistent judge-
ments – calling practices what they are, press-
ing for change, and binding these countries into 
an irreversible process of opening while they 
rise – would be a more genuine mark of re-
spect. It is also a precondition for realizing any 
model of global citizenship. 
Perhaps the most hopeful reality is demograph-
ic. The vast majority of the world’s population 
were born after colonialism, so the instincts to 
tread lightly based on past guilt and past griev-
ances may weaken. Moreover, non-Western 
racism is not a consistent problem throughout 
the Global South. Latin America and Africa are 
much more comfortable with messy diversity, 
and surveys show that their younger cohorts 
are quite cosmopolitan (Furia 2005). Much of 
the world’s demographic and economic growth 
will be concentrated there in coming decades, 
and not in the likes of Japan, China, and the 
Emirates. There is good reason to hope, there-
fore, that world order can be shaped along lines 
of openness rather than closure. 
By 2100, we are more likely than not to have an 
“immigrant world”, with all the institutional struc-
tures to make it work. But getting there would 
be much surer, and quicker, if the debate about 
consistency started now in earnest. 
 
Adam K. Webb has recently published an article 
titled “Not an Immigrant Country? Non-Western Rac-
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SOUTHERN SPECIFICITY OR SPECIOUS 
SEPARATION: PERSPECTIVES FROM 
SOUTHERN AFRICA 
by Loren B. Landau (South African Research Chair 
on Mobility and the Politics of Diversity, African 
Centre for Migration & Society, University of the 
Witwatersrand, Johannesburg) 
Research on Southern African mobility has 
generated a field rich in history and global 
scientific impact. Foundational works on 
modernization and urbanization stem from its 
complex processes of urbanization, 
segregation, and displacement (see, for 
example, Mayer 1961, Bozzoli 1988; Colson 
and others). Exile from apartheid-era South 
Africa, and the region’s independence, civil, and 
proxy wars have similarly generated 
extraordinary levels of displacement and robust 
scholarship (Lubkeman 2008). Now a space of 
relative peace and prosperity – by African 
standards anyway – it is characterized by an 
unusual mix of declining opportunities in 
industry and mining coupled with ongoing 
movements and urbanization. Documenting the 
social and political products of these 
movements raises real-world practical concerns 
(see Landau, et al, 2013) while providing fodder 
for conceptually transformatory academic 
intervention (Kihato 2013; Ferguson 1999; 
Landau 2014).  
At the most fundamental level, the driving fac-
tors for these movements – overlapping quests 
for protection, profit, or onward passage – do 
little to distinguish Southern African migration 
from that occurring elsewhere on the continent 
or in other regions of the world: the movements 
of people are predictable and patterned; the 
motives are mixed; and the consequences are 
economically, socially and spatially transforma-
tory.  
Despite these evident similarities, distinctions 
are visible in ways that should reshape our 
epistemological and conceptual approach to 
mobility. Indeed, across Southern Africa, new 
immigrants and the recently urbanized increas-
ingly co-occupy estuarial zones loosely struc-
tured by state social policy and hegemonic cul-
tural norms. As people urbanize for the first time 
in an era of de-industrialization, we are likely to 
see patterns of movement, solidarity, and ex-
change that may look familiar but are unlikely to 
settle into the kinds of socio-political formations 
seen historically in “the North”. Looking closely 
at these areas reveals cracks in the conceptual 
foundations on which discussions of migrant 
rights and integration debates are normally 
premised. The first crack is the host-guest di-
chotomy, framed as a distinction between na-
tionals and non-citizens. In these sites, few 
consider themselves local, and nationality is but 
one axis of difference. The second is the mech-
anisms for and the desirability of claiming politi-
cal rights; particularly the centrality of state laws 
and institutions, and migrants’ goals of political 
membership in a place-bound community. The 
state continues to matter, but it is one of many 
actors. To be sure, its primacy is anything but 
assured.  
The question remains whether accepting the 
necessity of specialized, spatialized analysis 
warrants a field (or fields) of inquiry delimited by 
distinctions of “South-South” or “Southern” mi-
gration? While we must be wary of Southern 
cases simply being treated only as deviations 
from a “Northern” norm, or case studies in glob-
al comparative projects, the intellectual and 
political risks of scholarly ghettoization are too 
high to draw firm boundaries.  
Given the specific question or concern to be 
addressed, it may well make sense to consider 
the relationship between labor and mobility in 
Benin and Brazil, or to compare the manage-
ment of cultural diversity between Singapore 
and South Africa. Yet there may be equally or 
even more compelling reasons to consider the 
securitization of migration across Africa as part 
of global trends emerging through the interac-
tions of aid, norms, and interests across re-
gions. Missing these connections –either by 
treating the “South” on its own, or as a deriva-
tive of “Northern” processes, misses the chance 
to identify universal trends and patterns or to 
test universalized claims of “global” theory de-
veloped largely from a limited set of OECD cas-
es. Given that migration is by definition multi-
scalar, any pre-ordained or geographic bounda-
ry is ultimately unjustified. For example, as 
“Northern” states increasingly work beyond the 
law, or as forms of difference are negotiated in 
ever more diverse “host” communities, we may 
ultimately see that Africa has – as the Comar-
rofs suggest – become the site in which to ob-
serve the West’s future.  
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There are also significant political consequenc-
es of working in ways that distinguish between 
Northern/global and Southern research and 
processes. In geographic terms we are likely to 
constrain Southern researchers, encouraging 
(or effectively demanding) that they study local 
or Southern migration patterns, if only because 
they cannot afford to conduct the global scoping 
or theorization valued in ‘Western’ universities. 
While this might help to create a kind of coun-
ter- or autarchic hegemony, it also de facto de-
nies them a seat at the table where global theo-
ry is discussed. Inasmuch as they engage 
transregionally, Southern partners will increas-
ingly have to trade their most valuable interna-
tional resources – legitimacy, “street cred”, and 
local insight – for financial resources, travel 
opportunities, and prestigious associations with 
northern partners. In the process they become 
native informants while allowing those in pres-
tigious, well-resourced universities in the North 
to synthesize, analyze, theorize, and set the 
global academic and even policy agendas (see 
Zeleza 1996; Chimni 2009). 
I take it as self-evident that this relative absence 
of “Southern” voices in global debates not only 
diminishes our understanding of the world but 
allows a relatively privileged, geographically 
concentrated group of scholars to set global 
academic agendas. So while we know that the 
majority of the world’s refugees and migrants 
are located in the South, Southern-based 
scholars are hard to find in the leading (i.e. 
most broadly cited) scholarly journals on the 
topic. Where they appear, it is usually through 
country case studies or as secondary authors. 
Rarely do they proffer multi-sited comparative 
studies, especially ones including multiple coun-
tries or regions. So while Northern scholars may 
struggle to justify work in the global South, 
Southern- (particularly African-) based re-
searchers often do little but conduct local case 
studies and policy reviews.  
This compromises one of Southern scholars’ 
most significant comparative advantages: the 
ability to identify what might be invisible or inex-
plicable to outsiders or to those doing global 
comparison. (That said, we must be suspicious 
of relatively elite Southern scholars who make 
exclusive claims to “local” knowledge). 
Schweigman and van der Werf (1994) outline 
one of the dilemmas this raises, a situation they 
term the Ganuza dilemma, where the absence 
of a strong, Southern intellectual agenda (or the 
presence of a highly fragmented one), often 
creates the space/necessity for Northern part-
ners to dominate decision-making and research 
directions. At an immediate level this may satis-
fy all involved, but it does little to overthrow 
Northern dominance of global academic dis-
course. 
My conclusions are anything but conclusive or 
definite. Rather, they call for the complementary 
development of a conversation between South-
ern specificity and global theorizing. This can 
provide scholars and activists with the infor-
mation they need to positively reform policies at 
the local or national level where it matters most. 
It will also strengthen Southern scholars’ hand 
in affording them both invaluable local 
knowledge and the capacity to challenge, and 
potentially shape, global academic debate. 
Such an approach will demand a reconsidera-
tion of pedagogy and research epistemology, 
and a willingness to be both deductive and in-
ductive in our concepts and causal inferences. 
Doing otherwise risks the political and theoreti-
cal gains for which we strive. 
 
 
Loren B. Landau is currently exploring comparative 
perspectives on how mobility is reshaping the politics 
of rapidly diversifying and expanding communities; 
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UNDERSTANDING HISTORICAL AND 
CONTEMPORARY LABOR MIGRATION 
PATTERNS AND PROCESSES IN 
SOUTHEAST ASIA 
by Amarjit Kaur (Emeritus Professor of Economic 
History, University of New England, Armidale, Aus-
tralia) 
Enduring patterns and processes in South 
East Asia 
From a temporal viewpoint, current labor migra-
tion movements in Southeast Asia typically rep-
licate past foreign labor migrations, while labor 
processes continue to mirror the significance of 
political-economic relationships in the region. 
Historically, international labor migration in 
Southeast Asia is best understood from the 
perspective of the region’s natural resources, 
demographic situation, and incorporation into 
the global economy. European imperialism after 
the 1870s, and the growth of the Atlantic econ-
omy were consistent with capitalist expansion 
and colonization of Southeast Asian states. 
Subsequently, these states became suppliers of 
mineral and other natural resources, and were 
also transformed by substantial waves of labor 
immigration, primarily from China and India. It is 
commonly assumed that the Asian migrants 
comprised only men, who journeyed either as 
forced or indentured workers to toil in Southeast 
Asia. This supposition ignores the migration of 
free men and women into the region. Further-
more, a majority of historians have also taken 
for granted that Asian migrations, like the Atlan-
tic migrations, ended in 1914, following the on-
set of World War One. In fact Asian “colonial” 
migrations continued into the 1940s and also 
afterwards. 
The gap in historical understanding about the 
different types of labor movement further ig-
nores the enduring patterns and processes 
connecting past and present migration move-
ments. These observations have also influ-
enced debates on contemporary economic mi-
gration in the region. In the 1970s and 1980s, 
sovereign Southeast Asian states embraced 
labor-intensive industrialization, and were pulled 
into the “new” international division of labor. 
Crucially, most states continue to depend on 
migrant workers, and their development path-
ways demonstrate the enduring socio-economic 
importance of migrant workers to their econo-
mies, as before. Currently, the more successful 
Southeast Asian states – Singapore, Malaysia, 
and Thailand – actively pursue foreign invest-
ment by remaining competitive and promoting 
their low-waged labor pools and market-friendly 
policy environments. In order to augment their 
diminishing less-skilled labor pools, whether for 
production of labor-intensive goods, or for con-
struction purposes, or to increase women’s la-
bor-force participation in the formal economy, 
these states depend greatly on foreign less-
skilled Asian migrant men and women workers. 
Significantly, a vital change has been in the 
“Work of Care”. The re-ordering of the gendered 
division of labor and the need to balance de-
mands for care work with equal opportunity for 
women residents has also led to recruitment of 
women mainly from South Asia and poorer 
Southeast Asian states to shoulder the respon-
sibility for the care of the elderly and children. 
Crucially, a major transnational change reflects 
the rising demand for professionals and skilled 
(or knowledge) workers in specific occupational 
categories. These changes, together with the 
creation of sub-regional labor markets, epito-
mize the new manifestations and diversity of 
migration movements in the region. 
 
Labor Migration and Labor Processes,  
1870s -1940s 
Southeast Asia’s greater integration into the 
new globalized system of production, trade, and 
investment flows in the second half of the 19th 
century resulted in the carving up and redraw-
ing of the region’s political map. Six major 
states were fashioned, namely British Burma, 
British Malaya, French Indochina, Dutch Indo-
nesia, Spanish (later American) Philippines, and 
independent Thailand. All the states were mobi-
lized for export production of foodstuffs, indus-
trial crops, stimulants, and minerals to boost the 
fiscal resources of the home countries. The new 
economic corridors, which extended from 
southern China and South India to Southeast 
Asia, facilitated labor market integration and 
mass proletarian migrations to Southeast Asia.  
The Chinese government did not support Chi-
nese emigration, and consequently Chinese 
migration comprised two main networks: kin-
ship-based migration, and the credit-ticket or 
steerage system. Labor brokers were also in-
volved in the second migration network system. 
 Reflections on migration in the Global South – Voices from around the world  
Global South Studies Center, University of Cologne, Germany – http://gssc.uni-koeln.de/node/781 
Chinese migrants were predominantly from Fu-
jian and Guangdong Provinces, and their jour-
neys took place via Chinese colonies that had 
been annexed by the Europeans. These includ-
ed Hong Kong and Macau and the other Chi-
nese treaty ports that were opened to British 
and other Western traders, following China’s 
defeat in Chinese-British trade conflicts known 
as the First and Second Opium Wars. Accord-
ing to McKeown (“Global Migration, 1846-1940”, 
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_world_hi
story/v015/15.2mckeown.pdf), only a small per-
centage of Chinese migrants bound for South-
east Asia migrated under indenture contracts. 
Generally, the European colonizers and the 
Thai state placed no limits on Chinese migra-
tion, though there were a few residential re-
strictions, for example, in Java.  
Organized (and regulated) labor migration gen-
erally took place between colonial territories 
under similar imperial administrations. Accord-
ingly, the India Office and the Malayan admin-
istration jointly planned and administered re-
cruitment programs for Indian labor bound for 
Malaya. This was done under the aegis of the 
Colonial Office in London. Both governments 
concentrated on recruitment practices, financing 
of travel, and transportation of workers to Ma-
laya, where the workers were linked to planta-
tions or public works departments. The British 
permitted some Indian labor migration to Suma-
tra (then under Dutch administration) while the 
Dutch allowed Javanese migration to Malaya. 
Burma represents a different category because 
it was governed by the British Indian govern-
ment and considered part of British India. Thus 
Indian migration to Burma was within different 
provinces in British India and hence regarded 
as an internal movement. The Dutch and the 
French in the Netherlands Indies and Indochina 
respectively authorized movements of workers 
from overpopulated to underpopulated areas in 
their colonies. According to Huff and Caggiano 
(“Globalization and Labor Market Integration in 




Burma, Malaya, and Thailand received more 
than 15 million Chinese and Indian migrants 
within the period 1881 to 1939.  
In the case of Indian migration, private labor 
brokers/intermediaries were entrusted with the 
job of facilitating and driving labor migration via 
two recruitment methods – the indenture sys-
tem and its variant, the kangani system. The 
indenture recruitment method authorized em-
ployers to utilize enforceable, written labor con-
tracts, and migrants were indentured for a fixed 
period, varying from three to five years (reduced 
to three years after 1904). Subsequently, rubber 
planters employed their trusted workers to re-
cruit Indian labor; hence introducing a chain 
migration outcome based on specific recruit-
ment areas in South India. This system, known 
as the kangani recruitment system, was essen-
tially a personal or informal recruitment system, 
and it became the preferred recruitment method 
after 1910. The kangani also provided the vital 
connection between impoverished areas in rural 
south India and the plantation frontier in Malaya 
by facilitating Indian migration.  
Some women’s migration, originally associa-
tional, improved when men and women were 
positioned differently in colonial labor markets. 
Consequently, task- and gender differentiation 
roles made women workers a cheaper alterna-
tive. For example, in the rubber industry, work-
ers engaged in weeding tasks were paid lower 
wages than tappers, and hence it was possible 
to turn this task into a women’s task and pay 
lower wages for “less strenuous” work. Fur-
thermore, the India Office had stipulated that a 
certain percentage of Indian women be included 
in the labor hires due to the isolation of planta-
tions. Consequently, the colonial administration 
was able to overcome the problem of isolation 
for the men and also lower production costs. 
Afterwards some overseers/kangani functioned 
as intermediaries/marriage brokers on planta-
tions. Nevertheless, the proportion of Indian 
women for every 1,000 men in the census years 
was as follows: 171 (1901); 308 (1911); 406 
(1921); 482 (1931) and 637 (1947) (see Kaur, 
“Crossing Frontiers: Race, Migration and Bor-
ders in Southeast Asia”).  
Wage differentiation was also prevalent in the 
tin mining sector. Panning for tin (a recovery 
method) in the tin tailings mounds was viewed 
as a more suitable job for women, and facilitat-
ed their gainful employment particularly during 
slumps. (Women were not allowed to enter 
mines). Thus women’s employment and wage-
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labor rights were deemed subordinate to those 
of men. Moreover, this policy enabled the Brit-
ish to achieve their goal of stabilizing the mi-
grant labor force in the two main industries 
without increasing male migrants’ wages. Con-
sequently, the additional family earnings played 
a central role in achieving the goal of settled 
communities (see Kaur, “Indian migrant workers 
in Malaysia”). This disparity in the pay scales of 
men and women migrant workers similarly con-
tributed to the continuing gendered migration 
patterns during the colonial period. Neverthe-
less, the percentage of women involved was 
rather small, and did not exceed more than 25 
percent of the migrant population. In Malaya for 
example, the Chinese sex ratio varied from a 
70:30 ratio at the beginning of the 1880s to a 
75:25 ratio by the end of the 1920s.  
 
Transnational Work and the post-colonial 
geographies of migration in Southeast Asia  
In the 1970s and 1980s international labor mi-
gration again became imperative for labor-force 
growth in Southeast Asia, analogous to the sit-
uation in Western industrial democracies. In the 
more developed Southeast Asian states – Sin-
gapore, Malaysia, and Thailand – changing 
economic environments alongside declining 
fertility levels have underscored continuing de-
pendence on skilled and less-skilled foreign 
workers (see Kaur, “On the Move: International 
Migration in Southeast Asia since the 1980s”. 
Against the backdrop of closer regional eco-
nomic integration in the Association of South-
east Asian States (ASEAN) through the ASEAN 
Economic Community, member states have 
also developed increasingly selective admission 
policies for professionals and highly skilled for-
eign workers and migrants’ educational qualifi-
cations, skills and networks have become im-
portant factors in their movement within 
ASEAN.  
Concurrently, for less-skilled migrants, their 
journey to Southeast Asia has become an 
ephemeral experience for them since they are 
needed, not wanted. Migration is also accepted 
in return for the money earned for migrants’ 
impoverished families. All three states have 
instigated managed migration policies to give 
migrant workers legal status and protection 
from exploitative labor practices; there are im-
portant policy differences between the three 
countries.  
In Singapore the government, which had initially 
established its sovereignty in 1960 by prohibit-
ing dual nationality, modified its immigration 
legislation in 1966 (after independence in 
1965). The government also concentrated on 
building the state’s economic foundations and 
signed bilateral labor agreements for recruit-
ment of temporary guest workers with neighbor-
ing South/Southeast Asian states. Concurrently, 
the state made it easier for professionals and 
skilled foreign migrants to get permanent resi-
dency (and later citizenship) under its “foreign 
talent” policy. These professionals are allowed 
to take their families along with them, and are 
not subject to levies. 
Malaysia too utilized the temporary guest-
worker migration scheme for employment of 
less-skilled workers, and signed bilateral 
agreements (Memoranda of Understanding) 
between Malaysia and destination countries. In 
both countries the guest worker programs are 
essentially two-tiered: they provide incentives 
for skilled workers, boost circular migration 
flows among low-skilled workers, and focus on 
border control regimes. Less-skilled workers are 
employed in occupations shunned by locals, 
including the construction, agricultural and fish-
eries, manufacturing, and service sectors. They 
are generally paid lower wages than national 
workers and are denied many of the rights of 
citizens. They also have to return home on the 
completion of their contracts; their employment 
pass is employer- and employment- specific, 
and they are not allowed to have their families 
accompany them. The guest worker program, 
which is dependent on networks, intermediaries 
and brokerage firms, reinforces wage disparities 
between host and home countries.  
In Thailand, the state’s development strategies 
similarly encouraged the entry of foreign labor 
migrants. Since foreign investors mainly bank-
rolled the manufacturing sector, the state al-
lowed these investors to recruit both highly 
skilled and less-skilled workers. In the case of 
low-skilled workers, unlike Singapore and Ma-
laysia, the Thai government does not have a 
comprehensive migration policy that allows for 
recurrent admissions and has granted work 
permits to selected countries only (Myanmar, 
Cambodia, and Laos). A large number of these 
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workers become unregistered because they are 
restricted to particular provinces. The govern-
ment also regularly employs a nationality verifi-
cation (NV) scheme in order to sort out the ille-
gal migration problem. Crucially, all three coun-
tries’ migration policies and processes for less-
skilled migrants have led to migrants’ suscepti-
bility to forced labor situations. Thus these 
states’ restrictive migration policies that concen-
trate on managing and controlling migration, 
effectively disregard migrants’ rights and agen-
cy. Consequently, less-skilled workers are often 
“captured” and held in to detention camps prior 
to deportation. In Singapore they are “appre-
hended” and forcibly repatriated by repatriation 
companies.  
Finally, international labor migration in South-
east Asia in recent decades has taken on a new 
dimension that focuses on the link between 
residency and labor needs alongside the rela-
tionship between rich and poor nations. The 
word “immigrant”, which normally implies per-
manent or long-term residence, is no longer 
considered appropriate for all categories of mi-
grants. It is now routine to use the word “migra-
tion” to describe the temporary movement or 
mobility of less-skilled workers, referred to as 
“migrants” while skilled migrants are classified 
as permanent residents or citizens.  
 
Amarjit Kaur is author of “Wage Labor in Southeast 
Asia since 1840: Globalisation, the International 
Division of Labor and Labor Transformations”, and 
co-edited “Mobility, Labor Migration and Border Con-
trols in Asia” (with Ian Metcalfe), and “Proletarian 
and Gendered Mass Migrations” (with Dirk Hoerder).  
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MIGRATION IN THE GLOBAL SOUTH: AN 
INDIAN PERSPECTIVE 
by Satyanarayana Adapa (Emeritus Professor of 
History, Osmania University, Hyderabad, India) 
The dominant western migration paradigm 
tends to privilege Europe-based trans-Atlantic 
mobility of people, skills, commodities, ideas, 
culture etc., and undermines the role of intra-
Asian migrations in the making of the modern 
world. The Eurocentric migration studies while 
prioritizing the role of western capital have also 
underplayed the role of Asian labor in the 
emergence of the international capitalist world 
order and modern globalization (for references 
on Eurocentric approaches see Adam McKe-
own, “Global Migration, 1846-1940” 
(http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_world_
history/v015/15.2mckeown.pdf). Moreover, the 
emphasis in such studies on the dominating 
role and influence of the metropolitan industrial 
world tends to undermine the historical role and 
significance of non-western regions and region-
al economic integration through migration. To 
challenge this assumption, this note addresses 
some aspects of the process of formation of 
regional/sub-globalization based on contacts 
and linkages between Asian countries by ex-
ploring the trajectory of migration of South Indi-
ans to Burma, Malaysia and the Gulf countries 
during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 
The Global South, mainly the Asian continent, 
has been closely integrated by the mobility of 
millions of its people across the seas/oceans. 
From about the mid-nineteenth century, migra-
tions within Asia were also closely linked to the 
changing global commercial, economic and 
political conditions. Although the Indians mi-
grated to the far off places in the Pacific (Fiji) 
and Caribbean islands and the Indian Ocean 
region (Mauritius and South Africa/Natal) pre-
dominantly as indentured laborers, the inter-
connectedness was greater within Asian coun-
tries than beyond. Available evidence suggests 
that between 1834 and 1917, around 1.3 million 
indentured laborers migrated to the above des-
tinations, whereas six million contract laborers 
went to Southeast Asia under the kangani and 
maistry systems (Clarck et al. 1990, “South 
Asians Overseas: Migration and Ethnicity”, p.8-
9). However, unlike the European migrations 
the Indian migration flows across the Bay of 
Bengal region were characterized by several 
forms of middle-men-mediated contract sys-
tems and debt-bondage. Labor migrations in the 
mid-nineteenth century from South India to the 
Bay of Bengal region, and since the 1970s to 
the Middle East/Gulf countries are a case in 
point.  
The Bay of Bengal’s circuits of migration both 
responded to and brought about changes on a 
global scale. For instance, Malaysian rubber – 
tapped by South Indian migrant workers – fed 
the American Automobile industry. During the 
colonial period, Malaya became the most eco-
nomically valuable tropical colony in the whole 
of the British Empire, whereas Burma became 
the largest rice exporter in the world, in a boom 
backed by Indian Chettiar capital and drawing 
millions of Indian migrant workers into the every 
sector of its economy. Indian migrations grew in 
the first two decades of the twentieth century, 
especially after the abolition of the indenture 
system. Around 28 million people crossed the 
Bay of Bengal in both directions between 1840 
and 1940. The Bay of Bengal region was home 
to one of world’s great migrations under Euro-
pean colonialism. Subsequent to the opening of 
the Suez Canal in 1869, large-scale Indian emi-
gration began with the development of Europe-
an commercial and industrial enterprises in 
Southeast Asia. It has been estimated that out 
of approximately 28 million people who emi-
grated from India up to 1940, close to 27 million 
went to just three destinations in Southeast 
Asia; Burma, Ceylon, and Malaya. In other 
words, the Bay of Bengal region accounted for 
nearly the sum total of India’s emigration history 
in the age of empire. During the post-colonial 
era, the Gulf boom of the 1970s and thereafter 
led to a considerable increase in the revenue of 
the oil-producing countries in West Asia and the 
Gulf region. During the last quarter of the twen-
tieth century, the South Indians responded al-
most immediately to the growing demands for 
labor in those countries. Starting on a modest 
scale in the early 1970s, this trend continued to 
grow. Between 1976 and 2011 more than 29 
million Indian workers obtained emigration 
clearance to work in the foreign countries, pre-
dominantly in the Middle Eastern countries. The 
gulf labor migrations are mediated both through 
the recruiting agents and social networks. In 
principle the Gulf migrations are voluntary and 
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free, though elements of compulsion and coer-
cion are noticeable.  
Indeed, unlike the trans-Atlantic migrations, 
South Indian migrations across the Bay of Ben-
gal region included short-term, chain, and re-
turn, as well as family-oriented patterns. In the 
case of South Indian labor migrations, devel-
opment of extensive middlemen and agents’ 
networks were crucial during both the colonial 
and post-colonial periods. The South Indian 
migrants relied on the networks and connec-
tions that kinship and local community provided 
to find jobs and security and to carve out new 
ways of migrating to Southeast Asia and the 
Gulf countries. Between 1844 and 1910, about 
250,000 indentured laborers migrated to Ma-
laya. The kangani-recruited labor formed the 
bulk of the labor force on the rubber estates. 
From 1844 to 1938, kangani-assisted migration 
accounted for 62.2 percent of total Indian labor 
migration, compared to 13 percent for inden-
tured migration. It was estimated that in 1920, 
only 12 percent of Indian workers were volun-
tary migrants, but this proportion had increased 
to over 91 percent by the 1930s. Thus it is clear 
that labor migration to colonial Burma was 
mostly temporary, short-term, and circular (so-
journing). As I pointed out in a recent article 
(“From Coromandal Coast to Suvarnabhumi: 
Intra-Asian Migrations in the Era of Globaliza-
tion“, p. 132-34), unassisted and voluntary labor 
migrations have become popular in Burma and 
Malaya during the first quarter of the twentieth 
century. 
 
During the first quarter of the twentieth century, 
the pace, patterns, and networks of South Indi-
an labor migration increasingly undermined the 
structure and function of the middlemen. Thus 
by the1930s assisted and free South Indian 
labor migration increased rapidly. In the devel-
opment of such a pattern the return migrant and 
village played a significant role. Available evi-
dence indicates that many of the returnees in-
vited their relations and friends to go over either 
to Burma or Malaya and take advantage of the 
opportunities there; while many returned with 
newfound awareness and competence. Never-
theless, the main difference between the Asian 
and the Atlantic migration circuits lays in the 
numbers of those who settled rather than re-
turned. Amrith, in “Migration and Diaspora in 
Modern Asia”, found that that between 6 and 7 
million Indian people, and a similar number of 
Chinese, had settled overseas by the end of the 
1930s; whereas 85 million people of British 
origin lived outside the British Isles by that time 
(p. 18). An examination of the available data on 
arrivals and departures from colonial Burma 
between the years 1889 and 1929, and for Ma-
laya between 1888 and 1935, indicates that 
more than 80 percent of the South Indian labor-
ers did not migrate to settle permanently.  
 
An argument can thus be made against the 
view that northern migrations were voluntary 
and free, while the non-European migrations 
were coercive, indentured and/or involuntary. 
An examination of the pattern and nature of 
Indian migrations since the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury indicates that indentured migrations consti-
tuted only a small part of the total migration 
flows. What is more, Asian migration is compa-
rable in scale to trans-Atlantic migration in the 
same period in the global context.  
 
 
Adapa Satyanarayana’s recent publications include 
the article “Beyond the Eurocentric History of Migra-
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INDENTURED MIGRATION WAS DRIVEN 
BOTH BY COLONIAL CAPITALISM AND 
BY REGIONAL SPECIFICITIES  
Interview with Vincent Houben (Professor of South-
east Asian History and Society, Humboldt University 
Berlin, Germany). The interview was conducted by 
Tobias Schwarz. 
Tobias Schwarz: Prof. Houben, you are a histo-
rian working on modern and contemporary 
Southeast Asian history. Can you briefly outline 
what you think is particular regarding the histor-
ical migration pattern of South East Asia?  
Vincent Houben: Southeast Asia has always 
been a region at the crossroads; therefore mi-
gration patterns involving China, India, and the 
Middle East have been an integral element of 
those economies and societies since long be-
fore Western colonization started. Several types 
of migration co-existed: labor migration within 
and between areas; religious pilgrimage; and 
resettlement as a consequence of political up-
heavals and conquest. Since colonialism and 
the rise of postcolonial statehood there have 
been attempts to survey and regulate existing 
migration patterns to a greater degree. Nowa-
days, temporary labor arrangements govern 
intra-regional migration (from Indonesia to Ma-
laysia, from Myanmar to Thailand etc.) as well 
as transregional or international migration 
(mostly towards the Gulf and Northeast Asia). 
 
TS: With regard to global migration history, the 
comparison is sometimes made between “free” 
migration in the Global North (i.e., massive 
waves of Europeans emigrating to the Americas 
during the 19th and early 20th century; or immi-
gration into the USA and Europe today), and 
“non-free” migration within the Global South (i.e. 
colonial indentured laborers). Can such contrast 
between “free Northern” and “unfree Southern” 
migration (still) be regarded as an appropriate 
description?  
VH: Amarjit Kaur’s book, “Wage Labor in 
Southeast Asia since 1840”, which connects 
Southeast Asian historical and contemporary 
migration, sums up the major research findings 
for this world region quite convincingly. Kaur 
indicates that during colonialism there existed a 
generic linkage between industrialization in Eu-
rope and the rapid growth of labor migration 
from China, India, and Java to plantations and 
mines in Southeast Asia. The predominant for-
mat was indentured labor, but many left their 
homes voluntarily. So, instead of contrasting 
free migration in the global North and unfree 
migration in the global South, one can observe 
that there existed and still exists a connection 
between North and South but that this connec-
tion cannot be simplified into a one-dimensional 
contrast between these two parts of the world.  
 
TS: What are the theoretical implications that 
follow from contesting the “free vs. unfree mi-
gration” distinction?  
VH: Between free and unfree labor migration 
there exists a whole spectrum of realities, which 
need to be specified according to context, both 
in a spatial and a temporal sense. What has 
been classified as “free” migration was often 
linked to the pressure of circumstance at home, 
so one can ask to what extent the choice to 
migrate has really been free. Implicated in con-
trasting a “free” North to an “unfree” South is a 
world-system model based on the work of the 
dependency theorists (Gunder Frank, Immanuel 
Wallerstein, Fernando Cardoso and others). 
However, the rise of the global South, particu-
larly the BRIC states, has replaced dependency 
with a world system based on multipolarity. The 
theoretical implication is that the dividing line 
between global North and global South has 
increasingly become obsolete, as nowadays we 
can find both free and unfree forms of migration 
all over the world.  
 
TS: Are the historical patterns of indentured 
migration in South(-east) Asia similar to those in 
other regions of the Global South, for instance 
because they were part of a common, integrat-
ed system of colonial rule? And would this imply 
that it makes sense to speak of a shared migra-
tion experience in the Global South? 
VH: The choice between commonality and 
specificity of indentured migration in Southeast 
Asia depends on the perspective taken by the 
researcher. Indentured migration was historical-
ly linked to a system of colonial rule, which dis-
played certain common features all across the 
global South. At the core was the establishment 
of tight control over available human capital in 
order to generate profit for the colonial state 
and European business. However, within this 
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uniformity on a general level, there existed con-
siderable variations in regional and even local 
patterns. Colonizers were most successful 
when they were able to build their systems of 
labor mobilization on already existing local ar-
rangements. In some areas the supply of labor 
as a consequence of non-regulated migration 
was such that free wage-labor arrangements 
could be installed. In other areas a lack of local 
labor supply necessitated the implementation of 
unfree labor arrangements and forced migra-
tion. The way in which indentured migration 
constituted itself was therefore driven both by 
the uniformities of colonial capitalism and by 
regional specificities.  
 
TS: In your work, you stress the relevance of 
historiographic research in order to understand 
contemporary societies. Can you give an ex-
ample of how the historical roots (of e.g. co-
erced labor) inform today’s structure of unfree 
labor migration?  
VH: If we look at the migration patterns and 
labor relations of domestic and construction 
workers from Southeast Asia in other parts of 
Asia and the Middle East, the similarities with 
the colonial era are striking – with regard to 
state regulations and surveillance, recruitment 
practices, and the nature of labor relations in 
the workplace. Assuming that there are system-
ic features of global capitalism which cause 
unfree labor migration to persist, and that there 
is an institutional memory involved in the mobili-
ty of labor, the study of history becomes all the 
more relevant for grasping the genealogy of 
contemporary labor migration in both the global 
North and the global South.  
 
 
Vincent Houben’s latest edited books include 
“Figurations of Modernity. Global and Local Repre-
sentations in Comparative Perspective” and 
“Southeast Asian Studies. Debates and New Direc-
tions”.  
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A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE ON MIGRA-
TION AND REFUGEES IN THE MIDDLE 
EAST AND NORTH AFRICA  
by Ibrahim Awad (Professor of Public Policy at the 
School of Global Affairs and Public Policy and director 
of the Center of Migration and Refugee Studies, The 
American University in Cairo, Egypt). 
International migration is a result of the function-
ing or malfunctioning of the global system, in 
both its political and economic segments. In few 
places is this more evident in the second decade 
of the 21st century than in the Middle East and 
North Africa region (MENA).  
Domestic and international conflicts have pro-
duced consecutive waves of refugees over the 
past several decades. The current Syrian dis-
placement is the most important refugee crisis 
the world has witnessed in recent times. Con-
secutive crises and the reactions and responses 
to them have revealed and reinforced the fragility 
of nation-states in the Middle East. “Nations” 
were broken down into their constitutive ele-
ments. Building the new political system in Iraq 
after 2003 based on religious, ethnic, and sec-
tarian belongings stands out as an eloquent ex-
ample of the breakdown of a “nation” that was 
already fragile because young. The drive behind 
this system-building process in Iraq could be 
considered as global. It had been conducted 
after an intervention that aimed not only to real-
ize the interests of Iraqis but also to achieve the 
“global good”. In Syria, violent actors in the civil 
strife that soon engulfed the country after it rose 
up demanding a pluralistic and democratic politi-
cal system brought out their religious and sec-
tarian affiliations and their open hostility to all 
others. In a way, the precedent of Iraq, followed 
by the practice of power in that country in the last 
decade, “legitimized” the political identification 
with primordial belongings. So far, the process 
has culminated in the Islamic State in Iraq and 
the Levant (ISIL) symbolically doing away with 
the borders between these two countries. Na-
tion-states are the cornerstone of the interna-
tional system. The concept is certainly not with-
out its flaws, either in theory or, more especially, 
in practice. All the same, disfiguring nation-states 
and building new political units on bases other 
than nations is an open challenge, not only to 
directly affected countries but also to the whole 
international system. If some of the cross-border 
population flows are due to the population’s 
wishes to escape violence and seek safe refuge 
in bordering or neighboring countries, others are 
an outgrowth of the realignment of political units 
along criteria other than nations.  
The Syrian crisis is a significant manifestation of 
the global reach of refugee issues. With Syrian 
refugees overflowing into neighboring Europe, 
the crisis brought out the closer-than-ever inter-
linkages between regions, and the inadequacy of 
the responses it has generated from actors at 
the international and regional levels. It has not 
proved possible, using the tools at the disposal 
of the international system, to find solutions to 
the conflict or to the resulting refugee flows – and 
this is not the first conflict of its kind. Neither Iraqi 
refugees a decade ago nor Palestinian refugees 
before them found solutions to their predica-
ments either. According to the international refu-
gee regime, return to countries of origin, reset-
tlement, and local integration are the durable 
solutions to refugee crises. Return to countries of 
origin demands the settlement of the political 
problems at the origins of population flights. For 
decades such solutions have proven elusive. 
Resettlement opportunities are a drop in the sea. 
Local integration first requires substantial finan-
cial resources for it to be carried out under condi-
tions of equality and non-discrimination on reli-
gious, sectarian, ethnic, gender, political opinion, 
or other grounds while at the same time also 
realizing the unmet economic and social de-
mands of native populations. Host countries do 
not have these resources. The global responses 
to these crises did not make up for the large 
shortfall in resources. Second, given the vol-
umes of population involved and the history of 
recent and fragile state formation in the region, 
local integration could open the door to the re-
configuration of the regional state system, which, 
obviously, is but a sub-system of the internation-
al system. “Sub-national communities”, the sub-
regional state system, and the international sys-
tem do not show any sign of being ready for 
such a reconfiguration. Therefore, it could be 
said that global responses have allowed neither 
local integration, resettlement, or voluntary re-
turn, nor the solving of the political problems 
necessary for that latter solution to materialize. 
From a global perspective, the reach of the con-
sequences of the refugee crises, especially the 
current Syrian one, is brought harshly to light by 
the population overflows to Europe.  
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But MENA is also an origin and transit region for 
international migration for employment purposes. 
Workers migrate within the region and to fellow 
Arab countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) in search for better employment opportu-
nities than those their own economies can cre-
ate. With the same objective, they also migrate 
to Europe and beyond, where they additionally 
respond to demand for labor. From countries to 
the south of MENA, workers arrive with the inten-
tion of joining flows to Europe. Nearly six dec-
ades after decolonization, the functioning of the 
global economy has not permitted African coun-
tries to develop and to raise the standards of 
living of their citizens. Rules of the global system 
and the functioning of sub-regional and “national” 
economies may well be at the origin of the pro-
longed stalemate and the resulting international 





























Unconsciously, labor seems to be moving to 
where the other factor of production of produc-
tion, capital, looks abundant. With the liberaliza-
tion of movements of goods, services, and capi-
tal, one question that arises is whether it is pos-
sible to keep labor as constrained in its mobility 
as it is at present. Occasioned to considerable 
extent by migration from or through MENA, away 
from the policy realm, some research is being 
carried out on the liberalization of labor move-
ments and its consequences. Good parts of civil 
society call for this liberalization. This reveals an 
evolution in global thinking about migration and 
the exclusive rights of nationals to access the 
territories of the states to which they belong. It 
also exposes a development in ideas about 
states’ monopoly over decisions about access to 
their territories. In sum, this is a reconsideration 
of “sovereignty”, or rather of how it could be re-




Ibrahim Awad’s most recent publications include 
“Population Movements in the Aftermath of the Arab 
Awakening: The Syrian Refugee Crisis between 
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ONE GOOD TURN DESERVES ANOTH-
ER: TREASURE-HUNTING BEYOND FA-
MILIAR SHORES 
by Francis B. Nyamnjoh (Professor of Anthropology, 
University of Cape Town, South Africa)  
 
Africa is a continent characterized by mobility 
as a normal condition of being human. While 
the tendency of states everywhere is to police 
and manage mobility so as to maximize the 
economic and political interests of those they 
consider citizens, those with capitalist ambitions 
of dominance do not expect Africans to be mo-
bile, especially beyond their continent, even as 
mobility is celebrated in principle and practice 
for others (Collier 2013: 11-26). When not sav-
aged by envenomed, razor-sharp territoriality, 
mobile Africans are often perceived by the na-
tionals and citizens of the host countries at 
whose borders they clamor for inclusion as an 
invasive and predatory inconvenience 
(Nyamnjoh 2013a). This was especially the 
case after the high-income societies of the West 
witnessed the largest increase in migration from 
poor countries from 1990-2000, an increase 
which coincided with deceleration in the growth 
of their high-income economies, thereby forcing 
them to respond by “retightening their immigra-
tion controls”, even if what followed as migration 
policies were “based on neither an understand-
ing of the process of migration and its effects 
nor a thought-through ethical position” (Collier 
2013: 51-52). Since then, those who counte-
nance African mobility do so selectively, like 
French President Nicolas Sarkozy in his pro-
vocative speech in Dakar on July 26, 2007, 
where he expressed the idea of “immigration 
choisie” (“chosen and not endured immigration”) 
– see the reactions it elicited from African and 
Africanist intellectuals, the first of which by 
Achille Mbembe (Bergson and Ngnemzué 2008; 
Foé 2008; Nyamnjoh 2013a; Collier 2013: 57-
142). African musicians in France – some of 
whom, like Papa Wemba, have been accused 
of using their position as musicians to smuggle 
hundreds of people from Africa who disappear 
upon arrival – have often composed songs to 
decry the arrest and deportation of fellow Afri-
cans. Petit Pays of Cameroon is said to have 
named his band Petit Pays et Les Sans Visa 
because he was once deported from France for 
not having a visa. African immigrants in France, 
and Africans seeking to emigrate to France, 
would argue that it was not without their exploi-
tation and dispossession under French colonial-
ism and neo-colonialism that “between 1945 
and 1975 French per capita income tripled”, 
resulting in what the French nostalgically refer 
to as “The Golden Thirty Years” (Collier 2013: 
28). This tendency to see the nimble-
footedness of being African (Nyamnjoh 2013b) 
purely in narrow economic terms is highly prob-
lematic, as it tends to suggest that mobility 
should be the exclusive attribute only of those 
who are economically viable. 
If there is any lesson mobile Africans could 
learn from their European and Western coun-
terparts, it is how to comb the world with impe-
rial ambitions of dominance, hunting with relent-
less greed for riches and resources in distant 
lands, and using coercive violence to dispos-
sess and indebt without being indebted. It is 
thanks precisely to this logic and approach that 
“Third World debtor nations are almost exclu-
sively countries that have at one time been at-
tacked and conquered by European countries – 
often, the very countries to whom they now owe 
money” (Graeber 2011: 5). For those Africans 
who have borrowed a leaf from Europe, uncon-
tested success comes from hunting for oppor-
tunities in distant unfamiliar lands, among dis-
tant unfamiliar others, who should not be close 
enough to appeal to one’s scruples and con-
science. Ideally, the lands should be distant 
enough to constitute hunting grounds and the 
people unfamiliar enough to be considered 
prey, and be preyed upon. Ruthlessness and 
detachment are the name of the game, as it 
permits one to freeze the humanity of those one 
seeks to take advantage of. This is a sentiment 
superbly captured by the Nigerian actor and 
musician, Nkem Owoh, in his song “I Go Chop 
Your Dollar”, in which he argues, inter alia, that 
the infamous scamming Nigeria is renowned for 
is just a game, and that no one should seek to 
moralize unduly about it (see his film, The Mas-
ter). He warns “Oyibo” [whites]: “I go chop your 
dollar, I go take your money disappear. 419 is 
just a game. You are the loser, I am the win-
ner.” In Cameroon the phenomenon of bushfall-
ing documents how Europe, North America, and 
other fruitful zones of accumulation have served 
as hunting grounds for mobile young Came-
roonians seeking to free themselves from the 
frustrations, pressures, and stress of undera-
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chievement and the paucity of prospects and 
opportunities in the homeland (Nyamnjoh 2011; 
Alpes 2011; Tazanu 2012; Nfon 2013; Pelican 
2013; Nyamnjoh 2014; Alhaji 2015). 
 
The excessive investment in governing and 
policing mobility by states – rich states in par-
ticular – is what brings about the apparent une-
qual and differentiated patterns of migration by 
which the West, despite its histories of migra-
tion with reckless abandon, seems to be sur-
prisingly alarmed today.  
 
 
Francis Nyamnjoh is currently finishing a book titled: 
“C’est l’homme qui fait l’homme”: Cul-de-Sac Ub-
untu-ism in Côte d’Ivoire”, from which he has ex-
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GENERALIZATIONS ABOUT “PATTERNS” 
OBSCURE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN 
MIGRATION PROCESSES ALL OVER 
THE WORLD 
by Alejandro Grimson (Professor of Anthropology at 
the Universidad Nacional de San Martín, Argentina) 
and researcher at CONICET 
I believe the answer to the question “Is it possi-
ble to distinguish patterns of migration in the 
Global South from patterns in the Global 
North?” is a simple no. The so-called “Global 
North” and the “Global South” are “entities” 
which are extremely heterogeneous in every 
respect. What is demographic homogeneity? 
Exaggerating the homogeneity of “the North” a 
bit, let us assume that there the birth rate is 
decreasing and the numbers of immigrants are 
rising. But are the United States of America with 
a little under three hundred million inhabitants, 
around forty million of which are immigrants, 
comparable to all countries of the north? Obvi-
ously not.  
It is important to clarify that when speaking of 
“migration”, we are not only talking about eco-
nomic or labour migration, we are also talking 
about people living in exile and political refu-
gees or those affected by displacement, for 
example, as the result of war. In my opinion, 
migration includes every phenomenon that in-
volves human displacement in a given territory. 
If we had to specify the date around which hu-
man migration began, the most adequate an-
swer would be the beginning of the human race. 
Archaeological finding and, more recently, the 
Old Testament, demonstrate just this, as one of 
the books of the Old Testament is called “Exo-
dus”. 
One could say that we are witnessing large-
scale migrations from the South towards the 
North, or from the ex-colonies to the metropo-
lises. But these are very limited descriptions 
within time and space. For example, one hun-
dred years ago we saw large-scale emigration 
from Europe to the Americas and Australia. 
After the Second World War, there was also 
emigration in the same direction, for example, 
Italians that migrated to Argentina (Fernando 
Devoto: Historia de la inmigración en la Argen-
tina). If we limit these movements to the current 
epoch (which is already a very crass limitation) 
the idea of patterns still would not work. What if 
the United States had ex-colonies in the Euro-
pean sense? Well, one could consider the rela-
tionship with Puerto Rico as a colonial relation-
ship and there are, in fact, four million Puerto 
Ricans in the United States. However, if any 
example were to break with the idea of patterns, 
it would be Puerto Rico: Puerto Ricans are born 
with the right to a United States passport and 
their migration to the United States is complete-
ly legal and it grants them the same rights and 
obligations as any other citizen of the United 
States. One also cannot compare the legal rel-
evance of jus soli (citizenship by birth on the 
territory) in all American countries to the match-
ing norms in Europe. Nationality laws are more 
similar in the United States, Canada, Argentina, 
and Mexico, than between the United States 
and Germany, for example. And although the 
legal framework is not homogeneous on every 
continent, there are even more issues that sep-
arate the continents than separate the “North” 
and the “South”. 
The most populated country of the supposed 
“South” and at the same time the most populat-
ed country on the planet is China, whose de-
mographic situation, process of urbanisation 
and some migratory norms do not comply with 
generalised patterns. It is obvious that Chinese 
emigration to various countries is very high, but 
the destinations of emigrants are not exclusively 
in the North, as they include Latin American and 
African countries. Furthermore, there are inter-
nal limitations with respect to migration within 
the country as well as with respect to civil rights, 
which are not feasible in most other countries of 
the world. Another relevant question is that 
generalisations of “patterns” essentially hide 
migratory processes in different world regions: 
migration within Africa, within South America 
and between Central America and Mexico. 
According to the United Nations (International 
Migration Report 2013), one can divide all of the 
international migrants in the world into three 
groups: Those who migrate from the south to 
the north, those who migrate between countries 
of the south, and those who migrate between 
developed countries. Regarding this last group, 
I can comment on the migratory system in the 
Southern Cone. Specialists have pointed out 
that, around the 1980s, there was a “regional 
migratory system” including Chile, Uruguay, 
Paraguay and Bolivia as countries of emigra-
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tion, and Argentina as a receiving country. Cur-
rently, Chile and Brazil have clearly become 
receiving countries, but if we consider South 
America, we must add three further elements: 
1) The Peruvian diaspora living in approximate-
ly twenty different countries; 2) the Ecuadorian 
emigration with an especially strong migration 
to Spain; 3) the Colombian emigration that in-
cludes large numbers from middle classes. (For 
those wanting a better understanding of certain 
migratory dynamics in the Southern Cone I rec-
ommend my book “Argentina and the Southern 
Cone”, co-authored with Gabriel Kessler.)  
 
In short, thinking in terms of patterns of the 
North and South will not help us to comprehend 
the complexities of contemporary migratory 
processes, which are a key issue to under-
standing where “the global” is heading to.  
 
 
Alejandro Grimson is researcher at CONICET and 
Professor of the Instituto de Altos Estudios Sociales 
of San Martin University, Argentina. His research 
interests are migration, border zones, and national 
identifications; among other books, he has published 
“Relatos de la diferencia y la igualdad. Los bolivia-
nos en Buenos Aires” 
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Fig. 1: The World Bank, International migrant stock (data.worldbank.org)  
ALTERNATIVE VISUALIZATIONS OF 
QUANTITATIVE DATA ON MIGRATION  
by Tobias Schwarz (Senior researcher at the Global 
South Studies Center, University of Cologne, Ger-
many) 
In a situation of ever-increasing mobility… well, 
this is how many accounts of globalization por-
tray the scale of international migration today. 
But is migration really increasing in terms of 
numbers? Some say it is not (Abel/Sander 
2014, “Quantifying global international migration 
flows”, p. 1521). Certainly, there is no uniform 
trend: in some regions, more and more people 
move (or are moved) across borders, while in 
other regions the numbers are falling (especially 
where they were extraordinarily high in the 
past). While it is of course theoretically possible 
to measure the total number of international 
migrants on a global scale, the relevance of 
such statement is questionable. To assume 
only one driving force behind them all would be 
implausible, and there is not one global pattern, 
but rather many regional ones (the South Amer-
ican system, the Southeast Asian system, etc.) 
and multilayered patterns (e.g. the routes of 
economic elites easily span across continents, 
while most refugees seek shelter in neighboring 
countries). Hence, what is the insight we gain 
from a generalizing concept such as that of an 
assumed “global trend”? At the same time, the 
conflated and sometime simplified depiction of 
the numbers of international migrants abounds. 
Let’s look at four different examples of how data 
on international migrant stock is generally pre-
sented, along with an innovative depiction of 
migrant flows.  
Probably the most intuitive way to present the 
total number of immigrants in various countries 
is to color in the respective country areas on a 
world map differently according to the numbers 
of immigrants there. Unfortunately, this can eas-
ily produce a grossly distorted picture, as one 
example shows. The World Bank website 
makes use of data from the United Nations 
Population Division publication “Trends in Total 
Migrant Stock”, and allows the generation of the 
world map shown in figure 1. The template used 
for this map is a variation of the Mercator pro-
jection used in most of the current web mapping 
applications. As we all know, it heavily distorts 
the relative areas of land masses, with the dis-
tortion increasing toward the poles, resulting in 
an overall increase in the apparent land mass in 
the northern hemisphere and a reduction of that 
in the southern hemisphere (due to the relative 
distributions of land in those regions). Just 
compare Greenland with Australia: the latter is 
in fact 3.5 times bigger than the former, but on 
this map it appears to be the other way around.  
But this quantitative distortion left aside, the 
countries colored in the darkest red this way 
appear to be evenly inhabited by large numbers 
of immigrants, which is obviously not the case. 
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Who wants to move to Alaska, really? Or settle 
in Arkhangelsk? This flaw is inevitably caused 
by taking national data as the baseline, and 
projecting it onto the whole area of the respec-
tive states instead of breaking those states 
down into equal-area territorial segments (which 
of course is not possible because such data in 
most cases is unavailable, and would in turn 
cause further issues of applicability; see as an 
analogous example how GDP could be graph-
ically related to population density).  
 
So, perhaps it is better stick to more abstract 
graphics? The United Nations Population Divi-
sion mentioned above provides a migration da-
tabase that covers the whole globe. In their 
publications they frequently distinguish “North” 
and “South”, and define “Europe and Northern 
America plus Australia, New Zealand and Ja-
pan” as the North, and the rest of the world as 
“South” (“Population Facts 2013”, p.4). Well, the 
Russian Federation is assigned to Europe 
(hence, in the worldview of the Population Divi-
sion, this large continent reaches from Portugal 
in the west to the Kamchatka Peninsula in the 
east), and Mexico is classified as part of the 
“South”. But never mind. The aggregation of 
countries into larger units (continents; less/more 
developed; North/South, etc.) is always theory-
driven and hence artificial to a certain degree. 
One example might suffice: one of the largest 
cross-continental and at the same time South-
North migration flows is from Mexico to the US. 
It is somewhat convincing that these two coun-
tries are located on either side of a South-North 
divide (defined in economic terms) – not without 
reason did Acemoglu and Robinson start their 
book on global economic divergence at the bor-
der in Nogales. But in terms of geography and 
history, both countries are in North America. It 
is not human movement across their border that 
requires explanation, it is the border that has 
been placed across human movement there. 
Yet this specific migration flow has over the last 
decades been (and continues to be) the main 
contributor to South-North migration on a global 
scale.  
Thus I find it striking how “North” and “South” 
are sometimes used as self-evidently meaning-
ful categories. In the reports of the UN Popula-
tion Division, we learn that most migration 
(36%, see figure 2) happens in and from the 
South – well, yes, the “South” accounts for 85% 
of the world’s population. There is no need to 
comment further on such very general dia-
grams.  
 
Fig. 2: UN Population Division, “Population 
Facts”, No. 2013/3 Rev.1, April 2014, p.1.  
 
It is safer to stick to geographic, hence seem-
ingly objective, definitions of units: the conti-
nents. Accordingly, the bar chart that gives ab-
solute numbers of immigrants for each conti-
nent is widespread (limitations as to where to 
draw the line between continents mentioned 
above apply). Among many others, Castles and 
Miller do this in their seminal work “The age of 
Migration” (see figure 3). But to provide stock 
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Fig. 3: Castles and Miller (2009): The age of 
migration. International population movements 
in the modern world. 4. ed., p.9.  
data only neither accounts for percentages of 
immigrants in relation to the total population 
(just think of Saudi Arabia, a country among 
those with the highest proportion of foreigners 
in the world, which appears as a white dot on 
the map in fig.1), nor does it show the regions 
of origin of those migrants. We also know that 
not only immigration, but also emigration 
changes a society.  
What is the alternative? The United Nations 
Population Division also offers their data on 221 
countries in the world nicely assembled on one 
poster (see fig. 4). This presentation might be 
prompted by a helpless urge to try to keep track 
of (and “fence in”?) the broad spectrum of 
migration experiences, but it does not really 
help if one is searching for comparisons or 
patterns.  
 
Fig 4: UN Population Division, Migration Wall-
chart, 2013  
 
I recently came across an alternative pictorial 
presentation of global international migration 
flows; a circular plot (see fig. 5). I like it more 
than other diagrams I’ve seen so far, for two 
reasons. First, it does not show data on migrant 
stock, but rather relates to flows. Hence it co-
vers immigration as much as emigration, and  
 
Fig. 5, Abel and Sander (2014): Quantifying 
global international migration flows. In: Science 
343 (6178), p. 1522.  
 
accounts for the empirical connection between 
sending and reviewing regions. Second, the 
circular shape schematically represents large-
scale regional proximities across the globe, and 
thereby allows for a visualization of relative dis-
tances. This is not perfect of course, but at least 
differentiates between arrows that connect 
segments next to each other and arrows that 
span the center of the image (the latter “reach-
ing across the globe”).  
This quick comparison of various ways of pre-
senting data on international migration shows at 
least one thing: charts give materiality to ab-
stract data, and in so doing may reinforce a 
taken-for-granted world view, and at worst “con-
firm” old preconceptions. But if data are aggre-
gated differently, or if the charts are constructed 
creatively, even if that involves going against 
the mainstream, they can also help to prompt 
us to think “off the beaten track”.   
Tobias Schwarz is member of the research group 
Citizenship and Migration at the Global South Stud-
ies Center.  
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MIGRATION TO, FROM, AND WITHIN 
THE AMERICAS  
Video interview with Jorge Durand (Professor of 







CHARACTERISTICS OF MIGRATION IN 
ASIA  
Video interview with Min Zhou (Professor of Sociolo-
gy, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore)  
Video: http://gssc.uni-koeln.de/node/800 
 
 
 
